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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-POLICE
FAILURE TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE
AND EROSION OF THE DUE
PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL
Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Arizona v. Youngblood,I the United States Supreme Court held
that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of
the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law." 2 After exploring prece-
dent in "the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evi-
dence,"' 3 this Note concludes that the Court's holding is
unsupported by prior case law. This Note argues that the Court's
bad faith requirement narrows a criminal defendant's due process
rights to a fair trial by hindering his or her access to critical evidence
and thereby denying presentation of a complete defense. Further,
prior cases mandate the analysis of the constitutional materiality of
withheld, lost, destroyed, or unpreserved evidence for the determi-
nation of due process violations regardless of the good or bad faith
of the police or the state. Finally, this Note argues that the Court's
bad faith requirement is not justified by the insulting belief that lim-
iting police obligations of preserving evidence outweighs criminal
defendants' due process rights to a fair trial, nor does it accomplish
its purported goal of easing police burdens, thus enabling them to
provide better service in the community.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. THE ASSAULT
On the evening of October 29, 1983, a ten-year-old boy, David,
was abducted from a church carnival around 9:30 p.m. after having
1 109 S. Ct. 333 (1988).
2 Id. at 337.
3 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982). See infra note 120
and accompanying text for discussion of this case.
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attended a service with his mother.4 The assailant took David to a
secluded area, molested him, drove him to a house, and sodomized
him five times.5 The attacker returned David to the carnival, threat-
ening to kill him if he reported the assault. 6 David withstood the
ordeal for approximately one and one-half hours.
7
Afterwards, David's mother rushed him to a hospital for a phys-
ical examination.8 Following standard procedure, the attending
physician collected samples with a "sexual assault kit" for legal evi-
dence of the attack.9 He used a swab to gather tissue samples from
David's mouth and rectum to identify the attacker's semen.10 After
the physician made a microscopic slide of these samples, he col-
lected samples of David's saliva, blood, and hair."' The police
stored the assault kit and samples in a police station refrigerator for
subsequent testing and use as evidence. 12 Although the police con-





9 Id. The Tucson Police Department distributed sexual assault kits to the county
hospitals for collecting physical evidence of sexual assaults. Id. The kit typically con-
tained paper to collect saliva samples, microscopic slides and Q-tip like swabs to pro-
duce smears of samples, and equipment to gather sample blood. Id.
10 Id. Five different tests used to identify semen samples were explained at trial.
Brief for Petitioner at 3, Youngblood (No. 86-1904). The state explained these tests:
Two of the tests, the ABO blood group test and the PGM enzyme test, are identifi-
cation tests which aid in narrowing down the field of possible semen donors. The
ABO test allows a person's blood type to be determined from other bodily fluids,
such as semen. This technique is only successful on 807 of the population that
secrete their blood types into their other bodily fluids. The ABO test is not success-
ful on the remaining 20%o of the population that are non-secretors, persons whose
blood type are [sic] not secreted into other bodily fluids.
The other identification test is the PGM enzyme test. The PGM test identifies a
genetic marker, other than blood type. The secretor, nonsecretor status has noth-
ing to do with the PGM test results. Every sample of semen, if the sample is suffi-
cient enough, will have detectable PGM grouping.
The other three tests serve to quantify the semen, not identify a donor. The
first technique is a microscopic examination of the sample. Based upon the nurqber
of spermatozoa viewed, an estimate can be made of the amount of semen present.
Another quantifying testing is the acid phosphatase test. This test measures the
enzyme, acid phosphatase, which is present in the semen. Based upon how much of
the enzyme is present an estimate can be made of the quantity of semen present.
The test has some limited forensic usefulness since vagina fluid also contains this
enzyme.
The last quantifying test is the P-30 protein molecule that exists exclusively in
the semen .... In 1985 only a little over half the crime labs in the country had
become capable of performing this test. Based upon the amount of the P-30 pro-
tein present, an estimate can be made of the quantity of semen present in a sample.
The Tucson Police began using the new P-30 protein technique in approximately
January, 1985.
Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, Youngblood (No. 86-1904) (citations omitted).
I I Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 334-35.
12 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335.
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fiscated David's underwear and T-shirt, the clothing was not
refrigerated. 13
B. THE SAMPLES
On November 8, 1983, a police criminologist1 4 examined the
contents of David's sexual assault kit. 15 He found semen in the sam-
ples indicating sexual contact had occurred. 16 He did not identify
blood group substances. 17 He did not try to ascertain the amount of
semen in the swab sample with a P-30 protein quantitative analysis
because this test was not yet used at that laboratory.' 8 David's
clothing was also not tested at this time.' 9
On October 15, 1984, a year after the first examination of
David's sexual assault kit, the same police criminologist performed
an ABO blood group test on the rectal swab.20 No blood group
substances were detected in the sample.2 1 In January, 1985, the
criminologist first examined David's clothing with the newly avail-
13 Id.
14 Edward Heller, the police criminologist, examined a smear slide made from the
rectal swab sample in the sexual assault kit under a microscope to determine if sperma-
tozoa existed in the sample. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
15 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335.
16 Id.
17 Id. The criminologist testified that he did not conduct a blood group substance
test because such tests were not ordinarily conducted at this stage of the investigation.
Id. For a discussion of blood group substances and the ABO test used to determine
blood group type, see supra note 10.
18 Brief for Petitioner at 4-5, Youngblood (No. 86-1904). For an explanation of the P-
30 protein procedure and its availability in police labs, see supra note 10.
19 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
20 Id. Some people secrete substances indicating their blood group type into other
bodily fluids, such as semen, while other people, non-secretors, do not secrete such
blood group identifiers. Id. at 3. The semen samples in David's sexual assault kit could
be tested for blood group types and compared with saliva and blood samples taken from
Youngblood.
In October 1984, the prosecution had moved to require that Youngblood give
blood and saliva samples for comparison with those taken from David the night of the
attack. The Court had denied the motion for lack of sufficient samples from David for
comparison. Id. at 5.
21 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335 (1988). According to the criminologist, because of
the small amounts of semen usually found on rectal swab samples, test results from
these blood group samples are rare. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
Absence of a blood type could have resulted because " the semen donor was a non-
secreter. That alternative would have eliminated Youngblood as the semen donor since
he was analyzed and found to be an A secreter. The second alternative ... was that the
secreter was of unknown bloodtype, because the sample was insufficient to determine
the type." Arizona v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. 50, 54, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986).
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able P-30 protein procedure.2 2 This test detected only a small trace
of semen on the clothing.23 An ABO blood group test failed to
identify a blood group from the clothing stains.
2 4
C. THE IDENTIFICATION
Although David did not wear his eyeglasses the night of his as-
sault,25 he rendered a fairly detailed description' of his assailant.
David described him as a middle-aged black man with greasy grey
hair, facial hair, no facial scars, and one almost completely white
eye.2 6 The respondent, Larry Youngblood, was a thirty-year-old
black man with dry black hair, a scar on his forehead, a bad left eye,
and a noticeable limp.2 7 He also always wore glasses in public.28
On November 7, 1983, nine days after the assault, the police
showed David a photographic line-up of men who had fit David's
description of his assailant.2 9 After telling him that they had ar-
rested the assailant, the police asked David to pick him from the
line-up.30 Absent his eyeglasses, David first picked Youngblood
from the line-up, then identified a different man from the same pho-
tographic line-up.31 The police then arrested Youngblood on De-
cember 9, 1983.32
D. THE CAR
David reported that his attacker had driven a white, medium-
sized, two-door car with a faulty passenger door, and that the radio
had played country music. 33 He stated that the car had started with
22 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335; Brief for Petitioner at 6, Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
For a discussion of the P-30 protein test, see supra note 10.
23 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335.
24 Id. The criminologist explained that the failure to find blood group substances
was a result of insufficient semen samples on the clothing. Brief for Petitioner at 6,
Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
25 Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 52, 734 P.2d at 594.
26 Id. at 50, 734 P.2d at 592.
27 Id. at 51, 734 P.2d at 593.
28 Id. Although David was satisfied with the accuracy of a composite sketch drawn
the evening of the attack, he later admitted that the sketch did not resemble the defend-
ant. Brief for Respondent at 3, Youngblood (No. 86-1904). The United States Supreme
Court majority did not raise or discuss the discrepancy between David's description of
the assailant and the defendant's appearance.
29 Id. at 335.
30 Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 52, 734 P.2d at 594.
31 Id. David's optometrist testified that David was supposed to wear glasses for
school, watching television, and other close work. Id.
32 Brief for Petitioner at 5, Youngblood (No. 86-1904). The police did not locate the
defendant until December.
33 Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 51, 734 P.2d at 593.
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an ordinary ignition key, had a messy interior with blankets or
sheets on the seats, and had rattled with a noisy sound.3 4 A month
after the assault, the police showed David two blankets telling him
that they came from his assailant's car.3 5 Without touching them,
David identified the blankets as from the assailant's car.
36
Six weeks after the attack, the police seized and towed Young-
blood's car, a white four-door Chrysler Imperial.37 Although the po-
lice dusted it for fingerprints and searched it for clothing and hair
fibers, no evidence existed of David's presence, only of Young-
blood's.38 The police then disposed of the car without notifying the
defendant or his counsel.39 The testimony of Youngblood revealed
that Youngblood's car had been inoperative at the time of the as-
sault, its battery had been removed and placed in another car, it had
ran silently when operative, and it had started with a screwdriver,
not a key.40 The police, however, had failed to determine if Young-
blood's car had been operative, had a noisy muffler, had a working
radio tuned to a country station, or had started with a key.
4 1
E. THE ALIBI
Youngblood had testified that he had been living with his girl-
friend, Alice Whigham, at the time of David's assault.42 The police
had first questioned Whigham four or five weeks after the inci-
dent.43 They had awaken her at 4:00 a.m. and had asked her if she
knew where Youngblood had been "'around Halloween.'"44 She
had told the police that Youngblood had not been with her on Hal-
loween, but had been living with her during that time period.45
Whigham later learned the actual date of the assault and telephoned




37 Id. Youngblood's car was taken from the home of his former girlfriend, Alice
Whigham. Id.
38 Id. at 51-52, 734 P.2d at 593-94.
39 Id. at 51, 734 P.2d at 593. The police justified their disposal of the car without
notice because Youngblood did not have title transferred to his name when he acquired
it. Id.
40 Id. at 51-52, 734 P.2d at 593-94. Testimony indicated that the battery had been
placed in Alice Whigham's car. Id.
41 Id. at 51, 734 P.2d at 593. The majority did not raise the issue of the police seizure
and investigation of Youngblood's vehicle. Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333
(1988).
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mation concerning Youngblood's whereabouts. 46 Whigham testi-
fied at trial that on the night of the assault she had been at her
mother's house; when she had returned home, the 10:00 p.m. televi-
sion news had been beginning, and Youngblood had been asleep on
her couch.4 7 Her house was a thirty to forty-five minute drive from
the site of David's abduction.
48
F. THE TRIAL
During the trial which began on February 5, 1985, the defense
asserted that David had misidentified Youngblood as the assailant. 49
Both sides produced criminologists who testified concerning the se-
men samples. 50 The police criminologist identified the tests that he
had performed on the swab and clothing samples and the results. 51
The defense criminologist opined concerning the police tests per-
formed on the samples and testified that the test results cast doubt
on the identity of the attacker.52 Both criminologists testified that
the P-30 test or the acid test might have exonerated Youngblood. 53
They further claimed that absence of any ABO blood group identi-
fied in a sample indicated either the sample was insufficient to pro-
vide a valid test result or the semen donor was a nonsecretor. 54
After several days of trial, the jury found Youngblood guilty of sex-
ual assault, child molestation, and kidnapping. 55
46 Id. Neither the police nor defense counsel returned Whigham's calls. Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 335 (1988).
50 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
51 See generally Brief for Petitioner at 6-8, Youngblood (No. 86-1904) (discussing tests
that were performed by both the police and defense criminologists); see supra notes 14-
24 and accompanying text for a description of the tests performed.
52 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Youngblood (No. 86-1904). Keith Inmin, the defense crim-
inologist, did not examine the sexual assault kit or David's clothing. Although he did
not test the swab or clothing semen samples, he tested samples of Youngblood's saliva
and blood and determined that Youngblood was a blood type A secretor.
Inman testified generally about the effect of time, temperature, and bacterial con-
tamination on the reliability of the ABO blood group and P-30 protein tests. He stated
that even if the police criminologist had found that the semen samples were large
enough to do an ABO blood group test, the results might still be uncertain. Id. at 7-8.
53 Arizona v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. 50, 54, 734 P.2d 592, 596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
The state never ran a P-30 protein test on the swab sample, which could have deter-
mined if the lack of ABO blood group results was from an insufficient sample or the
assailant was a non-secretor. Youngblood was a blood type A secretor. The state never
used acid phosphate quantifying tests on either sample. Brief for Petitioner at 6-8,
Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
54 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Youngblood (No. 86-1904).
55 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335. The judge instructed the jury that if they found that
the police had lost or destroyed evidence, they could " 'infer that the true fact is against
the State's interest.' " Id. (quoting 10 Trial Manuscript at 90).
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Youngblood claimed for the first time on appeal that the
charges should be dismissed because of police failure to preserve
and properly test the semen samples. 56 The Court of Appeals of
Arizona reversed, claiming that had the state properly preserved the
semen samples they might have proved Youngblood's innocence.57
The Supreme Court of Arizona denied the state's petition for re-
view.58 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to
consider the extent to which the Due Process Clause of the Federal
Constitution requires the State to preserve evidentiary material that
might be useful to a criminal defendant." 59
III. BACKGROUND
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the Constitution 60 prohibit governmental actions that de-
prive an individual of "life, liberty or property, without due process
of law." 61 Two distinct components of due process exist. First, sub-
stantive due process protects individual freedom from legislative
limitation by placing constitutional limits on the contents of legisla-
tive action.6
2
56 Brief for Petitioner at 15, Youngblood (No. 86-1904). "As the evidence showed, the
samples taken from the clothing would have contained more semen than the rectal swab
because of 'natural drainage and leakage.' The testimony also showed that since sam-
ples on clothing dry more quickly, there would be less chance for deterioration because
of moisture." Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 54, 734 P.2d at 596.
57 Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 55, 734 P.2d at 596. The court relied on its previous deci-
sion in State v. Escalante, 153 Ariz. 55, 734 P.2d 597 (1986), holding that " 'when iden-
tity is an issue at trial and the police permit destruction of evidence that could eliminate
a defendant as the perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due
process.' " Youngblood, 153 Ariz. at 54, 734 P.2d at 596 (quoting Escalante, 153 Ariz. at
61, 734 P.2d at 603 (state had duty to take routine steps to preserve semen samples
taken from victims of sexual assault)).
58 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 335.
59 Id. at 334.
60 "[Nlor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61 These procedural safeguards have their historical origins in the notion that con-
ditions of personal freedom can be preserved only when there is some institutional
check on arbitrary government action. The Supreme Court has analogized due pro-
cess to the Magna Carta's "guaranties against the oppressions and usurpations" of
the royal prerogative, in support of the basic conclusion that due process "is a re-
straint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the gov-
ernment, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress [or the states] free to
make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will."
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-7, at 664 (2d ed. 1988) (citations omit-
ted) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884)).
62 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 17.1, at 200 (1986) [hereinafter TREATISE].
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Second, procedural due process guarantees that individuals en-
joy certain processes when the government deprives them of life,
liberty, or property. 63 Procedural due process defines the constitu-
tional limits on judicial, executive, or administrative enforcement of
legislative or other governmental decisions. 64 For example, a trial is
required where the government seeks to deprive a person of his
physical liberty for a significant period of time. "The adjudicative
process itself is governed by the specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights and an independent concept of fundamental fairness which is
imposed by the due process clause." 65 However, governmental ac-
tions that are not a result of intentional governmental choices or
policies do not necessarily entail deprivations without due process
though they cause loss of life, liberty or property. 66
While the fifth amendment's due process requirement applies
to the federal government, the fourteenth amendment directs due
process to state actions. However, the Court's initial interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment only conferred rights equal to those
enjoyed by other citizens to the newly emancipated slaves. 67 The
Court declined to create new rights for citizens generally and re-
fused to review most state actions.
68
In the mid-1870s the Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases,69
63 Id.
64 L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 10-7, at 664.
65 TREATISE, supra note 62, § 17.4, at 214.
The [Supreme] Court has demonstrated a consistent belief that the adversary pro-
cess is best designed to safeguard individual rights against arbitrary action by the
government. Thejustices determine the scope of trial type procedures required for
any particular deprivation by balancing the worth of the procedure to the individual
against its cost to the society as a whole.
Id. 6 17.8, at 249.
66 Due process functions only to curb governmental abuse, unfairness, or oppres-
sion, not to compensate for injury caused by unintentional official behavior ...
"Not only does the word 'depnve' in the Due Process Clause connote more than a
negligent act, but we should not 'open the federal courts to lawsuits where there has
been no affirmative abuse of power.'. . . Far from an abuse of power, lack of due
care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable
person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle
of due process of law." Mere negligence of an official, then, does not implicate a
due process violation.
L. TRIBE, supra note 61, § 10-7, at 664-65 (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986) (no deprivation or cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
deputy sheriff negligently left a pillow on a flight of prison stairs which prisoner slipped
on causing injury); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (no deprivation and no
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when prison officials negligently failed to protect
a prisoner who told them his life was in imminent danger)).
67 J. MADDEX, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 19 (2d ed. 1979).
68 Id. at 19-20.
69 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (New Orleans butchers had no fourteenth amend-
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the first challenge, under the fourteenth amendment, to state legis-
lative action restricting the freedoms of state citizens. The Court
declined to break down the distinction between national and state
citizenship. That majority stated, "Such a construction ... would
constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the
States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nul-
lify such as it did not approve .... "70 For at least twenty years
following Slaughter-House, the Court held fast to this interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment.
7'
From 1887 to 1934, the Court reviewed and restricted state ac-
tions by recognizing individual rights almost identical to those guar-
antees protected by the Bill of Rights. 72 However, in these cases,
the Court held that the state activity violated due process rights be-
cause the action arbitrarily limited individual interests in liberty. 7
3
In 1897, the Court decided that the fourteenth amendment prohib-
ited states from taking private property for public use without just
compensation, similar to the fifth amendment prohibition against
like federal action.74 The Court held that due process required this
protection, not the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment.
75
By the late nineteenth century, the fundamental fairness doc-
trine had emerged. 76 First, it espoused that the due process clause
ment claim for protection against Louisiana law granting a monopoly to a slaughter-
house company within the city limits of New Orleans).
70 Id. at 78.
7' See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (grand jury indictment, jury
trial, and self-incrimination provisions of the Bill of Rights are not contained in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)
(Court refused to review article of Illinois Constitution making private grain elevators
public property and giving the general assembly the right to regulate the storage of
grain; legislature determined the amount of permissible regulation, not Court).
72 TREATISE, supra note 62, § 15.6, at 71.
73 Id.
74 Chicago, B. & QR.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (private property taken for
public use by the state without compensation is a violation of fourteenth amendment
due process, although Court found that railroad should receive only nominal compensa-
tion for public street crossing its tracks).
75 TREATISE, supra note 62, § 15.6, at 72.
76 The theories of total incorporation, fundamental fairness and selective incorpora-
tion emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They supported the
extension of certain rights to citizens against the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. Although the first theory advocating the total incorporation of the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment never received majority acceptance, it was nevertheless
the subject of heated debate. I W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 60
(1984) [hereinafter CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]. In the early 1890s, three cases involving
claims of infliction of cruel and unusual punishment by states reached the Court
presenting the total incorporation theory. In O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892),
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1881), and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1880), the
1264 [Vol. 80
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forbids state action that violates individual "fundamental" rights.77
Second, although it may include some of the rights in the Bill of
Rights, fourteenth amendment due process was separate from the
Bill of Rights. 78 The Court expanded its application of the four-
teenth amendment to state actions by selectively including rights
based on fundamental fairness.
79
Until the 1920s, the Court continued to hold that the four-
teenth amendment placed no specific requirements on state criminal
procedure. Rather, the Court reviewed state criminal trials only to
test for state court jurisdiction and for provision of a corrective pro-
cess for trial error.80 In the 1920s, the Court used the fundamental
fairness theory to incorporate the Bill of Rights protections into the
fourteenth amendment, applying them to state criminal procedure.
During the 1960s, the Court shifted from the fundamental fair-
ness doctrine to the selective incorporation doctrine.8' In 1968, the
Court flatly rejected the total incorporation doctrine as inconsistent with the Slaughter-
House decision, despite strenuous dissent. Total incorporation theory was raised and
again rejected in the early 1900s in, among other cases, Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.s.
78 (1908), and as late as 1947 in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, supra, § 2.3, at 65-66. The fundamental fairness doctrine was accepted by
the Court until the 1960s. Id. § 2.4, at 82.
77 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76, § 2.4, at 69. Fundamental rights had been
defined as those rights that are " 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' " that are
"'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamen-
tal,' " and that "deprive the defendant of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept ofjustice.'" Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Hebert v.
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884)).
78 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76, § 2.4, at 69. "Clearly as a 'standard for judg-
ment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a free society,' due process may
impose limits beyond those found in the specifics of the Bill of Rights." Id. § 2.4, at 71
(quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
79 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (due process requires the fourth
amendment protection of privacy from arbitrary intrusions by police but does not order
the exclusion of illegally seized evidence); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(prosecutor's knowing reliance on perjured testimony violates due process); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (failure to provide sufficient legal representation for de-
fendants violated due process not because the sixth amendment grants the right to
counsel but because effective appointed counsel was a prerequisite for a fair hearing);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (due process violated where trial judge compen-
sated only by fees collected when the defendant is found guilty); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (due process invalidated a state law prohibiting private reli-
gious schools); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess violated when trial conducted within a public mob atmosphere).
80 A. MASON & D. STEPHENSON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 352 (8th ed. 1987).
81 The two doctrines are alike in many ways. "Both read the due process clause as
encompassing only those rights deemed fundamental under an ordered liberty stan-
dard.... Both agree also that the ordered liberty standard may encompass rights found
in the specific Bill of Rights guarantees, as well as rights that extend beyond those guar-
antees." However, "[t]he fundamental fairness doctrine focuses on that aspect of the
guarantee that was denied by the state in the particular case.... The selective incorpora-
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Court incorporated the sixth amendment right to ajury trial.8 2 The
Court held that this inclusion depended on whether that right was
" 'fundamental to the American scheme of justice.' "8s3 Under this
theory, the "new test meant that the Court would be willing to en-
force values which the justices saw as having a special importance in
the development of individual liberty in American society, whether
or not the value was one that was theoretically necessary in any sys-
tem of democratic government. '8
4
The Court's due process criminal procedure decisions became
far more inclusive than those decided under the fundamental fair-
ness doctrine. Today, most of the protections of the Bill of Rights,
including those of criminal process, have been incorporated into the
fourteenth amendment due process clause.8 5 A provision of the Bill
of Rights extended to citizens against the states applies with identi-
cal force in both federal and state actions.
86
The Court recognizes the right to fairness in the criminal pro-
cess as a fundamental right, although no specific decision defines
fairness.8 7 Fundamental rights "hav[e] a value so essential to indi-
vidual liberty in our society that they justify the justices reviewing
tion doctrine, on the other hand, focuses on the total guarantee rather than on the par-
ticular aspect presented in an individual case." CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76,
§ 2.5, at 82-83.
For example, under the fundamental fairness doctrine, the Court in Powell v. Ala-
bama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), included the right to counsel in due process. However, it
included this right because effective appointment of counsel was a prerequisite for a fair
hearing in that case, not because the sixth amendment grants the right to counsel.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76, § 2.4, at 76.
82 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
83 TREATISE, supra note 62, § 15.6, at 75 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149).
84 Id. at 75.
85 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (fifth amendment double jeop-
ardy provision incorporated); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 145 (incorporated the sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (incorporated sixth
amendment right to compulsory process); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (ex-
tended sixth amendment right of confrontation to states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (self-incrimination protection of the fifth amendment applied to states); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (applied the sixth amendment right to counsel to
states); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (fourteenth amendment included
eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)); fourth amend-
ment regulation of searches and seizures held applicable to the states); Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961) (incorporated sixth amendment right to an impartial jury); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporated sixth amendment rights to notice and a
speedy and public trial).
86 TREATISE, supra note 62, § 15.6 at 78. "This concept is sometimes known as the
'bag and baggage' theory for it holds that when a provision of the Bill of Rights is made
applicable to the states it is applied with all of its previous federal interpretation-it
comes to the states complete, with its 'bag and baggage.''" Id.
87 Id. § 15.7, at 78.
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the acts of other branches of government" in a manner similar to
the fundamental fairness method.88 These individual rights do not
have a specific basis in the Constitution or its amendments.8 9
The Court has continually held that " 'a fair trial in a fair tribu-
nal is a basic requirement of due process.' "90 The criminal protec-
tions included in the Bill of Rights make up only part of the fair trial
protection; a fair trial includes many other guarantees. For exam-
ple, a criminal defendant has a right to material exculpatory evi-
dence withheld by the state.9 1
The Court often weighs the prospective right against its practi-
cal costs on the criminal justice system.92 The Court has found in
some cases that a provision extends a " 'constitutional command
that . . . is unequivocal,'" in which case balancing "the practical
costs incurred in applying the command become[s] irrelevant." 9
3
Where the Constitution does not command the right, the Court
tends to balance the guarantee against the practical costs of its
implementation. 9
4
Some justices favor withholding a guarantee if it greatly bur-
dens the state or justice system.95 Others give weight to practical
costs only where the burden is "substantial and clear, relates to an
important state interest, and cannot be offset by other measures." 96
These differences lead to inconsistent treatment of practical costs by
the Court. Some opinions hold practical costs as a reason to deny
the application of a particular provision.97 Other cases either men-
tion practical costs yet dismiss them or fail to acknowledge them
completely.98 The Court is continuously confronted with cases that
88 Id. § 15.7, at 79.
89 Id.
90 Id. § 17.8, at 259 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1965)).
91 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
92 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76, § 2.8 at 117.
93 Id. § 2.8 at 117-18 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980)). "The
command itself strikes a balance between the rights of the accused and society's need for
effective enforcement of the criminal law, and the Court is bound to accept that bal-
ance." Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (prosecution cannot justify
denial of constitutional right to a speedy trial by the expense involved in transporting
the defendant incarcerated in one jurisdiction to the jurisdiction of prosecution).
94 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76, § 2.8, at 118.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 119; see, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury
process would not be disrupted by allowing witness to challenge question as based on
unconstitutionally seized evidence).
98 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 76, § 2.8, at 119. Compare Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 787 n.11 (1973) (noting "the scope of the practical problem which would
be occasioned by a requirement of counsel in all revocation cases") with Morrissey v.
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demand a determination of whether a state practice or procedure
violates the due process right to a fair trial.
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY-THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BAD FAITH RULE
Writing for the majority,99 Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that
Youngblood required consideration of" 'what might loosely be called
the area of constitutionally-guaranteed access to evidence.' "100
The Court held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith
on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evi-
dence does not constitute a denial of due process of law."''1 The
Chief Justice expounded on the meaning of such bad faith:
We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of
the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve
evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases
where the interests ofjustice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in
which the police themselves by their conduct indicate that the evi-
dence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.' 0 2
The majority followed Brady v. Maryland, 0 3 which declared that
a defendant's right to due process was violated when state prosecu-
tors failed to fulfill the defendant's request for receipt of
prosecutorial evidence favorable to the defendant and material to
either his guilt or punishment. 104 The Brady Court stated that a due
process violation exists regardless of the prosecution's good or bad
faith in failing to produce the evidence. 10 5 The Youngblood Court
also referred to United States v. Agurs, 10 6 which requires the prosecu-
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (no discussion of costs of requiring a preliminary hearing
in all parole revocation cases).
99 Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy.
100 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 336 (1988) (quoting United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
101 Id. at 337.
102 Id.
103 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the petitioner and an accomplice were guilty of first
degree murder. Id. at 84. Although the petitioner had admitted taking part in the mur-
der, he had claimed that because his accomplice had committed the actual killing, he
should not have been sentenced to capital punishment. Petitioner's counsel had re-
quested from the prosecution access to the accomplice's extrajudicial statements.
Although the petitioner's companion had stated several times that he had committed the
actual killing, the prosecution withheld these statements from the petitioner. The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals' ruling that the
prosecution's suppression of evidence violated petitioner's due process protections. Id.
at 86.
104 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
105 Id.
106 427 U.S. 97 (1976). InAgurs, the respondent was convicted of second-degree mur-
1268 [Vol. 80
1990] DUE PROCESS: PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE
tion to disclose material evidence to the defendant regardless of his
or her request, although the entire file need not be revealed.
0 7
The Chief Justice argued that the Youngblood prosecution had
complied with the Brady and Agurs requirements by disclosing to the
respondent the existence of the samples and the relevant informa-
tion concerning testing.'08 To require the state to preserve evi-
dence for the defendant would expand the state's constitutional
duty beyond that imposed by Brady and Agurs. 0 9
Regarding preservation of evidence, the Court observed that in
California v. Trombetta," 0 the defendants had moved to suppress
breathalyzer test results based on the state's failure to preserve the
tested breath samples."' The Court had denied the motion be-
cause 1) the police had acted in good faith according to their normal
procedure, 2) the chances that the breath samples would have excul-
pated the defendants had been slight, and 3) the defendants had
alternative methods for proving their innocence."
12
ChiefJustice Rehnquist distinguished the Arizona Court of Ap-
peal's reasoning in Arizona v. Youngblood and Arizona v. Escalante"13
from Trombetta.114 The Trombetta standard of constitutional material-
ity spoke to evidence with exculpatory value apparent before the ev-
idence was destroyed. The majority argued, "Here, respondent has
not shown that the police knew the semen samples would have ex-
culpated him when they failed to perform certain tests or to refriger-
ate the boy's clothing; this evidence was simply an avenue of
der. Id. at 98. The respondent moved for a new trial based on his subsequent discovery
of the victim's criminal record, which would have supported his self-defense theory, and
on the prosecution's failure to disclose this record. Id. at 100. The trial court denied
the respondent's motion finding that the evidence had not been material to his case. Id.
at 101-02. The Court ruled that the prosecution's failure to turn over the evidence had
not been a violation of the respondent's due process rights where he had not requested
such evidence from the prosecution. Id. at 114.
107 Id. at I11.
108 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 336 (1988). ChiefJustice Rehnquist ob-
served that the state had disclosed to Youngblood the relevant police reports containing
information about the swab and clothing samples and had provided him the police crim-
inologist's laboratory reports and notes. The respondent's expert also had access to the
swab and clothing samples. Id.
109 Id.
11o 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
111 Id. at 482.
112 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 336 (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488-90). Although the
Chief Justice conceded that the evidence in Youngblood probably had more exculpatory
value than the evidence in Trombetla, he distinguished the cases by the state's failure to
use the evidence against Youngblood. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 336.
113 See supra note 57 for an explanation of the Arizona Court of Appeals' use of Esca-
lante in its Youngblood opinion.
114 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 336 n.**.
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investigation that might have led in any number of directions."" 15
The Chief Justice observed that the Brady interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause "makes the good or bad
faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the
defendant material exculpatory evidence." 1 6 He asserted that for
the respondent to state a due process violation his claim must be
based on a duty beyond the constitutional duty imposed on states by
Brady and Agurs. 117 He stated, "We think the Due Process Clause
requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State
to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than
that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might
have exonerated the defendant.""18 He extended to the states the
duty to act in good faith when considering the preservation of evi-
dence; criminal defendants must show bad faith by the state to
demonstrate a due process violation." 9
To support the bad faith requirement, the Chief Justice cited
several cases where the Court considered the good or bad faith of
the federal government's actions when handling evidence. 20 In ad-
dition, he weighed the police obligation to preserve evidence
against the "fundamental fairness" requirement of the due process
clause and determined that limiting the police burden necessitated
the bad faith requirement.'
2'
Applying then this test to the present case, the majority held
that the police had acted in good faith, thereby negating the due
process claim. 122 The majority also noted that the police had not
been constitutionally obligated to perform any specific or particular
test on evidentiary material.
123
115 Id. at 336-37 n.**.
116 Id. at 337.
117 Id. at 336.
118 Id. at 337.
11' Id.
120 Id. The Court cited United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (defendant was
unable to show that pre-indictment delay was a due process violation or that the govern-
ment intentionally delayed the indictment); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783
(1977) (due process not violated by the government's good faith pre-indictment investi-
gative delay); and United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (govern-
ment's deportation of illegal alien witnesses on its good-faith determination that they
did not possess favorable evidence for defendant was not a due process violation where
there was no evidence that their testimony would be material to defendant's case).
121 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 337 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941) ("due process purpose of prohibiting use of involuntary confession is to prevent
fundamental unfairness").
122 Id. The ChiefJustice stated that the police failure to preserve the semen samples
on the clothing could "at worst be described as negligent." Id.
123 Id. at 338. The Arizona Court of Appeals had obliquely referred to both the
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B. CONCURRING OPINION-THE OVERBROAD BAD FAITH RULE
Concurring with the majority, Justice Stevens agreed that the
respondent's rights under the due process clause had not been vio-
lated.124 He disagreed, however, insofar as the Court "announce[d]
a proposition of law that is much broader than necessary to decide
this case."1 25
Justice Stevens first observed that at the time when the state
had failed to refrigerate the clothing, it "had at least as great an
interest in preserving the evidence as did the person later accused of
the crime."' 126 Second, he conjectured unlikely that the state's fail-
ure to preserve the clothing prejudiced Youngblood.127 The de-
fense counsel had enlightened fully the jury of the state's actions
and the possibility that the tests could have proved the respondent's
innocence. 128 Furthermore, the jury instructions buffered against
prejudice. 129 Third, Justice Stevens asserted that the lost evidence
was "'immaterial"' because "no juror chose to draw the permissive
inference that proper preservation of the evidence would have
demonstrated that the defendant was not the assailant .... "130
Justice Stevens rejected the majority's broad requirement that
police bad faith must exist to establish a due process violation for
failure to preserve evidence. 15 He countered, "[T]here may well be
cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State acted
in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is none-
theless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial funda-
mentally unfair.'132
C. DISSENTING OPINION-THE CONSTITUTIONAL MATERIALITY TEST
Writing the dissent, Justice Blackmun 133 protested that the ma-
state's delay in administering P-30 tests until late in the investigation and its failure to
conduct any acid phosphate testing. That court had stated that such tests might have
exonerated Youngblood. Arizona v. Youngblood, 153 Ariz. 50, 54, 734 P.2d 592, 596
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
124 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
126 Id. at 338 (Stevens, J., concurring).
127 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
128 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
129 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). The trial judge had instructed the jury: " 'If you find
that the State has ... allowed to be destroyed or lost any evidence whose content or
quality are in issue, you may infer that the true fact is against the State's interest.'" Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting 10 Trial Manuscript 90).
130 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
131 Id. at 339 (Stevens, J., concurring).
132 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
133 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
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jority's ruling "improperly limits the scope of due process, and ig-
nores its proper focus in a futile pursuit of a bright-line rule." 134 He
noted that the unpreserved evidence was " 'constitutionally mate-
rial' " and that the state's failure to preserve it "significantly
prejudiced respondent" thereby depriving him of due process.
135
Justice Blackmun both protested the majority's claim that precedent
supported a bad faith requirement and remonstrated the Court's
failure to inquire into the constitutional materiality of the evidence
mandated by prior cases.
13 6
He contended that Brady and Agurs did not merely require the
state to disclose material evidence favorable to his case to the de-
fendant, but rather they mandated disclosure regardless of whether
the prosecutor acted in good or bad faith.' 3 7 Quoting Agurs, he
stated, " 'Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is mea-
sured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecu-
tor.... If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error,
it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of
the prosecutor.' "138 Justice Blackmun contended that the Agurs
Court had established the constitutional materiality of the evidence
as the proper due process standard which must be used when con-
sidering preservation of evidence as well as withholding evidence
claims. ' 39
Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's contention that
Trombetta 14 0 alluded to the good faith versus bad faith standards.
14'
He claimed that the Trombetta Court's "in good faith" referred to
normal police procedures, 14 2 thereby it "merely prefaced the pri-
134 Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun scoffed the majority's abil-
ity to create a bright-line rule, citing examples such as the difficulty in differentiating
between good and bad faith. Id. at 342 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 340-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), and California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), in support of the materiality requirement. For further
discussion of these cases, see supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
'37 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110
(1976)). Justice Blackmun justified his interpretation by repeating the majority's quota-
tion from Brady: " '[The] suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' " Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
139 Id. at 340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
141 Id. at 341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He asserted, "There is nothing in Trombetta
that intimates that good faith alone should be the measure." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
142 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting). The Trombetta Court adopted "in good faith and in
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mary inquiry, which centers on the 'constitutional materiality' of the
evidence itself." 143 Justice Blackmun refuted the majority's founda-
tion for the bad faith requirement.144
Justice Blackmun advocated the analysis of the constitutional
materiality of the unpreserved evidence:
To put it succinctly, where no comparable evidence is likely to be
available to the defendant, police must preserve physical evidence of a
type that they reasonably should know has the potential, if tested, to
reveal immutable characteristics of the criminal, and hence to excul-
pate a defendant charged with the crime.'
45
Applying this rule to Youngblood, he determined that the semen
samples on David's clothing were relevant, material evidence of the
identity of the assailant: the semen could have been tested to show a
characteristic of the assailant thereby possibly exonerating Young-
blood, and the respondent had no equivalent evidence available.146
Thus, Justice Blackmun concluded that Youngblood had been de-




The majority decision is a massacre of precedent and constitu-
tional protection of a fair trial. The Court's bad faith requirement
inadequately protects criminal defendants' due process rights to
accord with their normal practice" from Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 241-42
(1961) (the Court stressed the importance of compliance with usual police procedure
where it was held there was no due process violation by the police following the practice
of destroying notes used to prepare reports received into evidence). Youngblood, 109 S.
Ct. at 341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 340-41 nn.3 & 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued that
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), did not support the majority's
bad faith requirement. Id. at 340-41 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). First, the Govern-
ment's deportation of illegal alien witnesses was not negligent or malicious but rather
was in accord with immigration policy. Second, the Court went further than a good faith
analysis and required the defendant to show that the lost evidence was material to his
defense. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun discounted the majority's reliance on United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307 (1971), and United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), both of which had
involved pre-indictment delays. He stated, "The harm caused by such delay is certainly
more speculative than that caused by the deprivation of material exculpatory evidence,
and in such cases statutes of limitations, not the Due Process Clause, provide the pri-
mary protection for defendants' interests." Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 341 n.5 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 343 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146 Id. at 344-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that the swab
sample was the incorrect size for proper testing. Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
147 Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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present a complete defense and receive a fair trial. The Court
should have continued to apply the constitutional materiality stan-
dard supported by prior case law to uphold due process rights. Fi-
nally, the Court's weak attempt to justify its bad faith requirement
with public policy unconscionably limited police burdens to the det-
riment of due process.
Due process insures that a criminal defendant will be accorded
"that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.
In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the absence of
that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained of must be
of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial."148 Fundamental
fairness requires that criminal defendants "be afforded a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."'
149
A. PRECEDENT: BAD FAITH VERSUS MATERIALITY
When a criminal defendant is deprived of material evidence, he
is deprived of the fundamental right to a fair trial because he cannot
likely present a complete defense. Prior case law concerning state
withholding, state destruction, and police preservation of evidence
requires a materiality analysis of the evidence to determine due pro-
cess violations. The Court wrongly discarded the materiality stan-
dard in favor of a bad faith requirement that seriously narrows
criminal defendants' due process protections.
Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to reconcile adequately the
Court's bad faith requirement with existing criminal procedure case
law and the due process fair trial guarantee. His analysis of" 'the
area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence' "-50 recalled
Brady 151 and Agurs, 152 which controlled prosecutorial suppression of
evidence. In the former, the Court held that the suppression by the
prosecution of requested evidence favorable to defendant and mate-
rial to his guilt or punishment violated due process.' 53 The Brady
Court specifically indicated that such a violation may exist "irrespec-
148 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
149 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). The Court continued:
To safeguard that right, the Court has developed "what might loosely be called the
area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." Taken together, this group
of constitutional privileges delivers exculpatory evidence into the hands of the ac-
cused, thereby protecting the innocent from erroneous conviction and ensuring the
integrity of our criminal justice system.
Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
150 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 336 (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867).
151 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
152 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
153 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. See supra note 103 for a discussion of Brady.
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tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 15 4
In the latter case, the Court held that the prosecution had a
duty to disclose to the defendant material evidence regardless of his
request.155 Evidence is material when its admission would create a
reasonable doubt not otherwise present. 156 The Agurs Court ob-
served, "[I]f the suppression of evidence results in constitutional er-
ror, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character
of the prosecutor." 157 Both cases indicate that the key analysis of
evidence withheld from the defendant is of its materiality, not the
good or bad faith of the state.
The ChiefJustice asserted that a constitutional duty to preserve
evidence must be imposed by more than the mere materiality of the
destroyed evidence. This assertion is not supported by precedent
and narrows due process protections for criminal defendants.
He justifies his point by interpreting Trombetta,15 8 as excusing
the state from a due process challenge because it had acted in "good
faith and in accord with their normal practice."' 159 However, the
Trombetta Court did not stop its analysis at the absence of bad faith
by the state. After acknowledging the state had acted in good faith,
the Court continued, "More importantly, California's policy of not
preserving breath samples is without constitutional defect.
'Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to preserve
evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be ex-
pected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense."'160 The
primary inquiry of that Court was the constitutional materiality of
the evidence as "an exculpatory value that was apparent before the
evidence was destroyed."' 6 ' Justice Blackmun argued in Youngblood,
"There is nothing in Trombetta that intimates that good faith alone
should be the measure."' 6
2
154 Id.
155 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107. See supra note 106 for a discussion of Agurs.
156 Id. at 112-13. The Court did not include the more recent definition of materiality
found in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (court of appeals must decide
whether the result of defendant's trial would have been different if the prosecutor had
disclosed evidence that could have been used to impeach government witness). Evi-
dence is material if there is a "reasonable probability" that it "would" alter the trial
result. Id. at 682.
157 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110.
158 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (breath sample test results not sup-
pressed on the ground that the state had failed to preserve the tested breath samples).
See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for further discussion of Trombetta.
159 Arizona v. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. 333, 336 (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488 (quot-
ing Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961))).
160 Trombelta, 467 U.S. at 488.
161 Id. at 489.
162 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The Chief Justice maintained that a good or bad faith determi-
nation was necessary where a claimed loss of evidence was attributa-
ble to the government. 163 United States v. Marion 164 and United States
v. Lovasco 165 included claims that pre-indictment delay violated due
process. Yet, as Justice Blackmun argued, "The harm caused by
such delay is certainly more speculative than that caused by the dep-
rivation of material exculpatory evidence, and in such cases statutes
of limitations, not the Due Process Clause, provide the primary pro-
tection for defendants' interests."1 66
Chief Justice Rehnquist, still searching for support of a bad
faith requirement, butchered the import of his opinion in United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. 167 He interpreted Valenzuela-Bernal as re-
quiring "the prompt deportation of the witnesses [be] justified
'upon the Executive's good-faith determination that they possess no
evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution.' "168
This statement is the only reference to good faith in Valenzuela-
Bernal.
He continued his analysis in Valenzuela-Bernal, even in light of
the apparent good faith of the government, by investigating the ma-
teriality of the evidence that the witness could have provided the
defendant. He stated, "Sanctions may be imposed on the Govern-
ment for deporting witnesses only if the criminal defendant makes a plau-
sible showing that the testimony of the deported witnesses would have been
material and favorable to his defense...." 169 The Court tested the gov-
ernment's deliberate exportation of evidence by a materiality stan-
dard. Thus even Chief Justice Rehnquist does not assert that the
good faith/bad faith analysis is enough to protect the due process
rights of criminal defendants in access-to-evidence cases.
B. LIMITATION OF DUE PROCESS AND THE MATERIALITY SOLUTION
By discarding the materiality standard, the Court seriously nar-
rowed criminal defendants' fourteenth amendment rights to a fair
trial. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist went to great lengths to
erect a foundation for his bad faith requirement, he failed to cite a
single prior case that supported the proposition that the state's
good faith precluded an analysis of the materiality of the evidence in
163 Id. at 337.
164 404 U.S. 307 (1971). See supra note 120 for further discussion of Marion.
165 431 U.S. 783 (1977). See supra note 120 for further discussion of Lovasco.
166 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 341 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167 458 U.S. 858 (1982). See supra note 120 for further discussion of Valenzuela-Bernal.
168 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 337 (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872).
169 V7alenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873 (emphasis added).
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controversy. The Court had no basis to refuse to evaluate un-
preserved evidence by the materiality standard and to extend a bad
faith standard to the preservation of evidence issue. Indeed,
Trombetta mandates that the constitutional materiality of evidence be
considered to establish a due process violation for failure to pre-
serve evidence.
170
In Youngblood, the exact character of the lost evidence was un-
known.171 Unlike the analyzed breath samples in Trombetta, the un-
preserved semen samples were untested. Lost evidence requires
courts to imagine the nature of the destroyed information and the
extent of its import on the defendant's case. However, the bad faith
requirement unsatisfactorily addresses the problem of unknown evi-
dence. This standard improperly limits due process. Lessening the
standard by which the state must act to preserve evidence will likely
lead to negligent 72 loss of vital defense evidence without penalizing
police. As both Justices Stevens and Blackmun pointed out,
although the state may act in good faith, even negligently, the de-
fendant may nevertheless be denied a fair trial where lost, de-
stroyed, or uncollected evidence is vital to his or her case.'
73
Furthermore, the defendant should not have to suffer from the
state's procedural errors; the state certainly does not run the risk of
suffering procedurally from a defendant's mistake. If a defendant is
denied access to material evidence necessary to a complete defense,
he or she suffers from an unfair trial regardless of whether or not
the state intended to withhold the evidence.
Justice Blackmun constructed a variation of the strict materiality
standard to be applied in Youngblood situations where the character
of the unpreserved evidence is unknown. He stated, "[W]here no
comparable evidence is likely to be available to the defendant, po-
170 See supra note 161 and accompanying text for the Trombetta definition of
materiality.
171 This Note does not attempt to consider the full range of issues posed by un-
preserved evidence. See Comment, The Prosecution's Duty to Preserve Evidence Before Trial,
72 CALIF. L. REV. 1019 (1984), for a more complete discussion of the difficulties of deal-
ing with lost or destroyed evidence and determining its probable effect on the defend-
ant's case.
172 As the majority implies by imputing that the police in Youngblood were at most--!
negligent, negligent police actions resulting in the loss of evidence are not considered in
bad faith for due process claims. Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 337.
173 Justice Stevens argued, "In my opinion, there may well be cases in which the de-
fendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or
destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair." Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 339 (Stevens,J, concurring). Like-
wise, "As Agurs points out, it makes no sense to overturn a conviction because a mali-
cious prosecutor withholds information that he mistakenly believes to be material." Id.
at 341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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lice must preserve evidence of a type that they reasonably should
know has the potential, if tested, to reveal immutable characteristics
of the criminal, and hence to exculpate a defendant charged with the
crime."' 174 Regardless of whether the Trombetta strict materiality
analysis or a variation such as that proposed by Justice Blackmun is
implemented, the most important factor to consider in preservation
of evidence cases is the quality of the unpreserved evidence. A
criminal defendant refused access to critical evidence for any reason
is denied a fair trial.
C. BALANCING DUE PROCESS AND POLICE BURDENS
The Court weighed the right to a fair trial against the cost to
police of preservation of evidence and determined that the costs
tipped the scales of justice. 75 By limiting the police burden, the
Court unjustly narrowed due process protections of a fair trial. The
Court thus eroded a valuable criminal protection by mandating the
evaluation of the good or bad faith of state action, a standard that
fails to accomplish its proported policy goals of easing police bur-
den and providing society with greater protection from crime.
Upon observing the practical considerations of limiting police
responsibility, the majority rightly concluded that the police should
not carry the onus of preserving all remotely relevant evidence. 176
Such a burden on the police-especially when crime rates skyrocket
and police and prosecution are severely unprepared to meet soci-
ety's needs-is impracticable, unenforceable, and unnecessary. 177
However, while limiting some mandated preservation of evidence,
the majority's bad faith standard failed to accommodate adequately
the competing consideration of the due process right to a fair trial.
The preservation of this right far outweighs the competing need to
limit the state's burden. "The Constitution requires that criminal
defendants be provided with a fair trial, not merely a 'good faith' try
at a fair trial .... Regardless of intent or lack thereof, police action
174 Id. at 343 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175 The majority marked its "unwillingness to read the 'fundamental fairness' require-
ment of the Due Process Clause as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and abso-
lute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary
significance in a particular prosecution." Id. at 337 (citation omitted).
176 See supra note 121 and accompanying text for the majority's balance of due pro-
cess and police burden.
177 For example, the Court has held that the prosecution is not constitutionally man-
dated to reveal its entire file to the defendant, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111
(1976), nor is it under a constitutional duty to disclose a "complete and detailed ac-
counting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case," Moore v. Illinois,
408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972).
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that results in a defendant's receiving an unfair trial constitutes a
deprivation of due process."
178
Additionally, the majority's bad faith standard fails to respond
adequately to society's crime protection needs. Although easing the
police burden of preserving evidence possibly allows them more
time to attack other crime problems, the bad faith standard merely
causes ambiguity and decreases police incentives to take due care in
investigations of criminal conduct.
A bad faith test of the preservation of evidence is ambiguous.
Does a defendant have to show actual malice on the part of the state
or is a showing of recklessness sufficient? "Does 'good faith police
work' require a certain minimum of diligence, or will a lazy officer,
who does not walk the few extra steps to the refrigerator, be consid-
ered to be acting in good faith?"
179
Furthermore, the police lack the incentives present under the
materiality standard to consider carefully the importance and rele-
vance of all evidence. Such care could increase the accuracy of in-
vestigations. However, with the demolition of this incentive by
Youngblood, police can in "good faith" disregard or neglect evidence
that does not immediately appear useful to the defendant without
considering its materiality. This neglect can impair the accuracy of
investigations.
The Court wrongly established a standard that both decreases
police incentives to conduct accurate investigations and narrows un-
justly criminal defendants' due process rights to a fair trial. The ma-
teriality standard would better accomplish the Court's goal of aiding
police in meeting society's crime protection needs. It would do so
while, more importantly, protecting criminal defendants' due pro-
cess rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority limited criminal defendants' due process rights to
a fair trial by requiring bad faith on the part of the state without
inquiring into the materiality of the evidence and its affect on the
trial. The majority's bad faith standard is not supported by prece-
dent and is ambiguous. Both the quality of the lost or destroyed
evidence and its effect on the defendant's case indicate whether or
not the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial, not the good or
bad faith of the state in failing to preserve the evidence. The materi-
178 Youngblood, 109 S. Ct. at 339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179 Id. at 342 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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ality test180 is the most acceptable standard by which to judge state
failure to preserve evidence for the defendant.
SARAH M. BERNSTEIN
180 A suitable variation of the materiality standard, such as that proposed by Justice
Blackmun, would adequately meet criminal defendants' due process rights. See supra
note 145 and accompanying text for Justice Blackmun's proposal.
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